The October 2024 issue No. 10 of the magazine "Material and Technical Support" is now available to the public, which includes an article discussing how Russia revealed that the repairability of their tanks is 3-5 times lower than previously officially stated.
Additionally, the same magazine offers intriguing assessments regarding the level of protection of the Russian army's light armored vehicles in the context of the experience gained from the full-scale war against Ukraine. Specifically, it explains why Russian attackers do not use their BTR-70s for assaults, instead preferring the BTR-80 and BTR-82, despite an overall shortage of armored vehicles.
The answer to this question is as follows: Russian military personnel are dissatisfied with the level of protection and ergonomics for the crew and troops in the BTR-70, hence they prefer to use the BTR-80 and BTR-82 for support in assault operations, as these are more comfortable and better-protected vehicles equipped with diesel engines. The publication states that "the BTR-70 has demonstrated its complete unsuitability for use in combat operations."
For illustration, we can refer to data from The Military Balance 2024, which indicates that at the beginning of this year, the Russian army had nearly 3,000 armored personnel carriers in service, including 700 units of BTR-82A/AM, 1200 BTR-80, and 100 BTR-80A (the compilers of the reference book classified the BTR-82A and BTR-80A as infantry fighting vehicles), along with 800 BTR-60 of all variants and only 200 BTR-70. Additionally, 1300 units of BTR-60 and BTR-70 were in storage.
Regarding the issues with the protection of the BTR-70, the following details are provided: the armor can be penetrated throughout the entire hull by heavy machine gun fire, and damage also occurred from explosive fragments; the destruction of armored personnel carriers was also caused by RPG-7s, targeting the troop and engine compartments.
The mentioned publication also includes data on the nature of combat damage sustained by enemy BMP-1, BMP-2, and BMP-3 during battles against the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
In particular, it notes that the typical areas of combat damage on Russian infantry fighting vehicles, resulting from hits from anti-tank grenade launchers and direct or fragmentary mine strikes, are mainly located on the hull, in the engine, and troop compartments.
When an RPG-7 grenade hits, there was observed complete penetration of the armor, or turret displacement due to the destruction of the turret ring (in the case of BMP-2), or jamming of hatches and doors (in the case of BMP-3).
In cases of close mine detonations, fragments penetrated the armor and fuel tanks in the doors of the troop compartment, after which the BMP would catch fire, followed by the detonation of the ammunition, characterized by the turret being blown off 5-7 meters away from the vehicle's hull.
Regarding the issues with the protection of their armored vehicles, the Russians in the aforementioned material provide a general conclusion: "During the investigation of the causes of ammunition detonation in tanks and BMPs, a number of design flaws were identified in the arrangement of the combat compartment, the placement of ammunition and fuel in unarmored sections, and the use of fire suppression systems with thermal sensors, which do not ensure reliable fire extinguishing in the engine and combat compartments."
In other words, the Russians acknowledged that their tanks and infantry fighting vehicles require a complete overhaul of the internal layout.
At the same time, a rather specific proposal was also mentioned later in the text that deserves attention: to equip tanks and armored vehicles with automated smoke screen systems for the safe evacuation of crews from damaged vehicles or to simulate damage. It is quite probable that the Russian army might adopt such "know-how" into its operations.