Initially, social media showcased footage of a significant amount of Russian-made military equipment in Mali. At first glance, this appeared to be merely a lavish gift to the Kremlin's African satellite, especially considering that Russian forces are resorting to "jihad-mobiles" in their battles against the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Subsequently, a noteworthy clarification emerged from the bmpd blog of the Russian "Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies," claiming that this was a convoy of equipment belonging to the "African Corps" of the Russian Ministry of Defense. This convoy included seven T-72B3 tanks, five BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, and over fifty other types of armored vehicles—significantly more than previously believed.
It is important to remind that under the guise of the "African Corps" lies a reincarnation of the Wagner Group's units, which are currently operating under the direct command of the Russian Ministry of Defense on the African continent. This pertains not only to the aforementioned Mali but also to Libya.
Notably, this convoy managed to amass a considerable array of equipment, which in number could be equivalent to or even exceed that of the Malian armed forces.
According to the Military Balance 2024 report, at the beginning of last year, the Malian army had a land force of 19,000 troops and possessed only two PT-76 tanks, five BRDM-2 armored vehicles, 63 armored personnel carriers of various types, and 274 wheeled armored vehicles of different kinds; regarding artillery, they reportedly had over 30 D-30 howitzers and BM-21 "Grad" rocket launchers.
Meanwhile, there is no publicly available data on the total number of Russian troops currently stationed in Mali or how much equipment and weaponry the "African Corps" may possess in this country.
One can observe a rather intriguing logic in the actions of the Russians, as they have managed to establish an advantage in certain segments of weaponry over the country where they are currently conducting operations, which is also beneficial in terms of economic resources for waging war against Ukraine.
Furthermore, the decision to deploy a convoy to distant Mali consisting of seven tanks, five BMPs, seven armored personnel carriers, and 50 wheeled armored vehicles might seem entirely rational to the Russians. For instance, such a quantity of armored vehicles could be easily lost by Russian invaders in the East of Ukraine within just half a week of fighting against the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
This again raises the question of what priorities the Russians currently have regarding the use and distribution of armored vehicles to achieve their military-political objectives.