The Russian Federation is unwilling to yield its ambitions in the Mediterranean region and is seeking alternative options following the fall of the Assad regime. Amidst the currently fruitless negotiations between the Kremlin and the new Syrian authorities—the group "Hayat Tahrir al-Sham"—the Russians are gradually shifting their focus to Libya.
Specifically, unnamed American officials have reported on the transfer of naval forces from Syria to Libya. It is believed that Benghazi is being considered as an alternative to the port of Tartus, while the Khmeimim airbase is being compared to Al-Khadim. CNN notes that Moscow is applying pressure on the commander of the Libyan army, Khalifa Haftar.
Defense Express reminds us that a civil war began in Libya in 2011, lasting intermittently until 2020 and resulting in the effective division of the country. The Government of National Unity is located in the west, including the capital Tripoli, while the Government of National Stability is centered in Tobruk in the east. It is precisely with the latter that Russia is trying to negotiate, especially since it had actively supported Khalifa Haftar before, including providing weapons and "Wagner" fighters.
It is also worth noting that Khalifa Haftar has very old ties with Moscow. In the late 1970s, he underwent the well-known "Vystral" command courses, and in the early 1980s, he trained at the Frunze Military Academy. Conversely, in the 1990s, he obtained American citizenship and allegedly attempted to incite a rebellion against Gaddafi in 1996 without success.
Since the beginning of the civil war in 2011, he has been actively involved in combat. From 2017, he received maximum support from Russia, and in 2019, he launched an offensive on Tripoli, which ended in failure, leading to a ceasefire agreement between the parties in 2021.
For a detailed account of this war, one can refer to a separate article by retired American four-star Admiral James Stavridis, who in 2020 elaborated on the main causes and aspects, including the key external players.
Currently, Russia genuinely requires new bases in the region, without which it may lack military leverage on NATO's southern flank and maritime access to its African assets. However, payment for these bases to Khalifa Haftar may only come through direct military support and armaments. In turn, he could use these new resources to resume hostilities and seize control of the entire country.
At the same time, it is unlikely that the Kremlin can replicate what was done for Syria in the past. Even organizing an analogue of the "Syrian Express" is no longer feasible due to the lack of access through the Bosporus and the global shortage of armaments.